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Introduction
In  2007  the  United  Nations  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples  (UNDRIP)  was
adopted  by the  General  Assembly  of  the  UN.  Its  purpose  was  to  better  protect  the  rights  of
indigenous  peoples  around  the  world,  by  establishing  basic  norms  -  mainly  human  rights
supplemented with some specific needs in the form of collective rights, like self-determination - for
the treatment of these groups of people by the states they live in. It was the result of a process that
had taken 25 years. Historically speaking, it was a big achievement for indigenous peoples to have
their  rights  protected  and  their  special  needs  recognized  in  international  law  -  a  system  that
traditionally protected European sovereign states and legitimized the suppression of the indigenous
inhabitants  of  colonized  territories.  Also  remarkable  was  the  cooperation  of  indigenous
organizations  in  the  process  of  creating  this  declaration:  large  numbers  of  representatives  of
indigenous organizations were granted access to the meetings where the UNDRIP was written. For
'Subaltern' people – that is, underprivileged, non-Western people – like indigenous peoples, being
able to influence  jurisprudence at a globally powerful but, mainly, Western dominated institution
like the United Nations is a momentous but rare accomplishment that deserves a closer look. It
would be useful to know what the actual role and contribution of indigenous representatives during
the writing process has been. This could shed light on the question whether Subaltern people were
in this case really able to breach their underprivileged outsider position, and if they did, how other
Subaltern groups can also give expression to their needs in the international political arena. To this
end, this  thesis  will  answer the question:  How does the process of creating new international
norms  regarding  indigenous  peoples'  rights  work  in  the  UN  and  are  indigenous  peoples
themselves heard in this context? 
To understand the position of indigenous peoples in international law and the changing of
ideas and laws concerning them, theoretical work of different  authors about  the concept of the
Subaltern, about international law and about the dynamics of international norms is applied. The
first chapter discusses these theories. To answer the research question above, it is necessary to know
how the UNDRIP was created, who took part in this and what decisions were made: the process.
This is discussed in the second chapter. But to determine whether indigenous peoples actually had a
voice in the writing process and in the text of the UNDRIP in the sense that Gayatri Spivak means
when she asks “can the Subaltern speak?”, original research was conducted that is discussed in
chapter three.  Firstly,  the reports  of the discussions at  the commissions were the UNDRIP was
created were analysed to gain insight into the role of indigenous organizations that were present.
Secondly a discourse analysis was conducted of the text of the UNDRIP and the text of an earlier
version of the UNDRIP. Analysing the discourse of a document can help see through the language
that  is  used  and  debunk  the  power  relations  and  structures  that  lie  behind  it.  Underlying  this
approach is the theoretical assumption that discourse, used here in the meaning of social interaction
in the form of language, is productive: it produces representations of reality which are not value-
free or objective, but add meaning to facts (Hansen, 2014, p.172). When these representations are
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used over and over again, this specific representation of reality becomes 'naturalized', and is no
longer questioned (Neumann, 2009, p. 61). This productive function of discourse also means that
discourse defines who can speak and act (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). The analysis of the UNDRIP
shows what representations and, especially, normalizations are to be found in the UNDRIP and what
dynamics they reveal. Also the power relations between the actors that are mentioned in the text –
the  indigenous  peoples,  states  and  the  UN  itself  –  become  clear.  Finally,  the  norm  of  self-
determination as it has been codified in the UNDRIP has been analysed. This norm was the most
important part of the UNDRIP for the indigenous organizations present at the writing process, and is
therefore used as a means to see what influence indigenous representatives had on the UNDRIP. 
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Chapter 1.  The Subaltern, International Law and Norm 
Dynamics: a Theoretical Approach
This  thesis  focuses  on  the  creation  of  the  UNDRIP and  analyses  the  role  indigenous  peoples
themselves play in this process. In this first chapter the conceptualization of the three important
concepts that will be used in this analysis is discussed: the Subaltern, international law and norm
dynamics.  The  concept  of  the  Subaltern  provides  a  helpful  lens  through  which  to  look  at  the
position of indigenous peoples in today’s world, while the discourse of international law firmly
keeps a Western system and language in place in which indigenous peoples have to find their voice.
The  goal  of  making  their  voice  heard  and  having  their  demands  codified  as  rights,  can  be
understood as the process of creating a new international norm. 
1.1 Indigenous people as the Subaltern
The  underprivileged  position  of  non-Western  populations  around  the  world  has  been  theorized
extensively by postcolonial and critical theorists. A concept that cannot be missed when studying
postcolonialism is the  Subaltern,  a word first used in this context by Antonio Gramsci and later
brought to academic attention by a collective of academics known as the Subaltern Studies Group
(Sylvester, 2014, p. 188; Gandhi, 1998, p. 1). This collective, working in India in the 1980s, wanted
to increase both the knowledge about and the influence of Subaltern people – generally meaning
people  in  an  underprivileged  position,  oppressed,  subordinated  or  of  inferior  rank  or  class,
especially in the non-West – by focusing on their stories and issues (Sylvester, 2014, p. 188-189;
Gandhi, 1998, p. 1). One member of the Subaltern Studies Group, Gayatri Spivak, went on to raise
the question whether the Subaltern can speak, focussing on how the Subaltern can take part in a
discussion within a  Western  framework in  which he himself  is  always  at  a  disadvantage.  This
Western framework extends outside of the academic world to international politics and law as well.
The United Nations itself is arguably built on the framework of Western political thought as an
originally Western institution. Western political thought exists of political, legal and social theory
based  on  specific  assumptions  and  values  that  originate  in  Western  culture  (Ivison,  Patton  &
Sanders,  2000,  p.  2;  Pahuja,  2013,  p.  46),  like  economic  growth,  development,  modernity,
individuality,  or  globalization,  that  are  constituted  as  universal  in  Western  discourse.  The
international political  and legal system as it  exists now, is a framework based on these values.
Because of this specific framework, the international system creates inequality between the West
and the non-West,  because the non-West  does  not share or  meet,  in  equal  form, these specific
values. As Sundhya Pahuja argues, the international system promises equality to the 'other' in the
non-West through development and the pursuit of the right, 'universal' values (2013, p. 3, 63). The
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act of universalizing the Western political framework therefore creates a leading position for the
West as well as an inescapable inferior, dependent and disadvantaged position for the non-West
(2013, p. 48).
Spivak explains how this process of subordination works within Western discourses. She
describes  how the  Subaltern,  by speaking,  would  only  confirm and  strengthen  his  subordinate
position, because the Subaltern would speak within a paradigm constructed by European knowledge
and norms that is itself obsessed with preserving the dominant position of the European/Western
subject. Indeed, this Western framework was made to promote Western economic interests (Spivak,
1987, p. 271). The Western subject makes it look like he has no geopolitical agenda, but at the same
time he commits epistemic violence: he determines the narrative of reality and makes his version the
normative one (p. 281). While Spivak considers the Subaltern voice to be inaccessible outside his
own cultural (and epistemological) space, Robbie Shilliam and others have another approach, one
that  leaves  more  room to study the  actual  impact  of  Subaltern  voices  in  political  or  academic
discourse. Shilliam recognizes the fact that the non-Western subject is at risk of not being taken
seriously because its knowledge is seen as 'traditional' and 'context sensitive', as opposed to Western
thought, which is considered to be context-free and universal (2011, p. 13). Therefore John Briggs
and Joanne Sharp argue (although they are very critical) that non-Western voices can exist and be
heard within international academia or politics, but this cannot happen within a Western framework
and therefore, Western thought must loose its universal position (Briggs and Sharp, 2004, p. 662).
This means that Western academic knowledge must lose its universal position as the only 'real',
'scientific' thought and become just one voice in the discussion (Shilliam, 2011,  p.  4; Briggs and
Sharp, 2004, p. 662). 
 To sum up, Spivak argues that the Subaltern cannot truly be heard in a Western context,
while Shilliam and others advocate an equal exchange of ideas within a neutral framework, as to
avoid  translation  into  such  a  Western  context.  Problematic  is  the  fact  that  in  general,  in  any
discussion with other voices, the process that leads to decisions that are made and ideas that are
used, might be opaque and disguising the powerful position Western thought continually occupies
(Briggs & Sharp,  2004,  p.  664,667).  It  is this decision making process, the discussion between
Western and non-Western voices and the power processes that are working within the discourse, that
will be uncovered in this thesis to see whether a real exchange is taking place and whether the
Subaltern is really heard.  By applying the concept of the Subaltern to indigenous peoples, we can
conceptualize their struggle for indigenous rights as an attempt by Subaltern voices to speak and be
heard. Moreover, they are trying to do this within the Western framework by translating their ideas
and demands into Western concepts (Ivison, Patton & Sanders, 2000, p. 36), namely, applying the
language of human rights to their struggle. This is a difficult task, and it raises Spivak's question if
the Subaltern can truly be heard. 
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1.2 International law and indigenous rights
In international law, where there is no standard law or central judicial authority, codification of
norms happens often in declarations of the UN. In the UNDRIP, basic human rights as well as
specific needs of indigenous peoples are codified as entitlements, things they can claim they are due
to receive. This means indigenous interests are translated into universal international laws. There
are  some  things  that  are  an  obstacle  for  indigenous  people  to  trust  in  and  acknowledge  the
jurisdiction of international law. First of all, international law has European origins and has been
universalized and used to normalize other societies since (Lâm, 2009, p. 589; Pahuja, 2013, p. 46;
Anghie, 2004, p. 4-6). The history of international law however is more complicated than that. The
colonial era has been a pivotal moment in its conception and the relationship between European
states and non-European colonies shaped many of its doctrines (Anghie, 2004, p. 3). For example,
the central doctrine of sovereignty gave European states the right to claim territories and govern
them and the peoples on them without having to answer to any higher authority. Later, when many
colonies became ('Third World') states, the same sovereignty principle was used to legitimize the
repression of minorities and separatist movements, that sprung up because many of the new states
consisted of large territories that were occupied by many different peoples and cultures (Anghie,
2004,  p.  207).  This  makes  international  law  seem  foremost  an  imperial  force  and  makes  its
legitimacy at least questionable in the eyes of many indigenous peoples (Ivison, Patton & Sanders,
2000, p. 3; Pulitano, 2012, p. 6). However, as Sundhya Pahuja argues, international law has a dual
quality to it: it once was a tool to keep colonial and imperial authority in place, but now it has
turned into a tool to accomplish change and fight for rights as well (Pahuja, 2013,  p.  1-2). This
means the same judicial system that first endorsed dispossession of lands, now contains norms that
actually benefit the fight of indigenous peoples for self-government and other rights (Anaya, 2003,
p.  184). Participating in the international arena however, means to submit to the rules that are in
place. Fighting for indigenous rights at the international level may, in the words of Jerome Levi and
Bartholomew Dean,  “signal  a  willingness  to  concede the autonomy of  Subaltern groups to  the
power and adjudication of larger, dominant polities” (2003, p. 2). This is similar to Spivak's point
that the Subaltern cannot genuinely speak and be heard within the framework he must endorse to be
able to speak in the first place. In the case of the participation of indigenous representatives in the
process that created the UNDRIP, indigenous peoples already subjected themselves to the rule of
international law and endorsed the position of the UN as authoritative international institution. 
 The dominant framework in which indigenous rights are understood, is the framework of
human  rights.  The  attention  of  the  UN  to  human  rights  has  been  absolutely  crucial  to  the
development  and  formulation  of  rights  of  indigenous  peoples  (Keal,  2003,  p.  121).  The  most
obvious reason for separate rights for indigenous peoples that are not the same as general human
rights, is the argument that some rights that are essential to indigenous peoples are collective, not
individual  rights.  The most  important  example is  the right of self-determination,  that  is  in turn
essential to the preservation of the cultural identity of indigenous peoples (Keal, 2003,  p.  137).
Another reason for specific indigenous rights is the fact that, in the case of land rights, the general
distributive justice applied to distributing land puts indigenous people at a disadvantage because in
the case of land it often is not just a 'fair share' they claim, but a very particular share: a piece of
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land that has been sacred to them for a long time (Ivison, Patton & Sanders, 2000, p. 10). Now this
land  is  part  of  a  sovereign  state  that  denies  their  claim  to  it.  Sovereignty  was  the  basis  of
colonialism and is what indigenous peoples lost under colonial international law (Alfred, 2001, p.
26).  Indigenous  peoples  are  now  advocating  for  a  kind  of  restitution  in  the  form  of  self-
determination.  States  find  this  demand  problematic  because  sovereignty  has  always  been  an
exclusive property of the nation state and granting it to peoples within the state, would challenge the
state  system  (Keal,  2003,  p.  114).  This  is  why  for  indigenous  peoples  the  state  system  is
problematic,  as  it  cannot  grant  them  actual  self-determination;  according  to  Taiaiake  Alfred
accepting the small measures of self-government or “tribal sovereignty” that is offered them by
some states,  would only mean they endorse the  domination of  the  state's  legal  framework and
therefore affirm their own subjected position (2001, p. 30); a similar point to that of Spivak. 
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1.3 The dynamics of international norms
The UNDRIP can be seen as the codification of new international norms. Martha Finnemore and
Kathryn  Sikkink's  theoretical  work  on  norm  dynamics  gives  insight  into  the  life  cycle  of
international norms and the factors that influence the changes in internationally accepted norms
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Norms, generally defined as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for
actors  with  a  given  identity”  (1998,  p.  891)  are  important  inter-subjective  standards  within  a
community (of people, or of states for example) that have, in the words of Finnemore and Sikkink
“a quality of oughtness”. This means they articulate what is considered appropriate behaviour and
often are so internalized that following them is taken for granted while breaking them might result
in  wide  disapproval  or  even  outrage  within  the  given  community  (p.  891-892).  Examples  of
international norms are the sovereignty principle, considered a basic property of the nation state and
taken for granted in most  international dealings between states,  or human rights,  which have a
strong moral character by portraying how basic conditions for human life ought to be. An important
concept in Finnemore and Sikkink's norm dynamics theory is that of the norm entrepreneur: the
agent or agents that bring an issue to attention and advocate for solving it by adopting a new norm.
In  the  process  of  proposing  a  new  norm,  the  norm entrepreneur  often  uses  new  language  or
interpretations of the issue to 'frame' it in a new way (p. 897); an example is the abolition of slavery,
for which its proponents reframed the keeping of slaves as a dehumanizing practice and no longer
viewed  slaves  as  property  but  as  human  beings.  The  'life  cycle'  that  Finnemore  and  Sikkink
formulated to explain the coming and going of international norms, starts with the stage of norm
emergence, in which norm entrepreneurs – individuals, organizations or states – try to persuade a
'critical mass' of states (which are the actors in the field of international norms) to adopt a new norm
(p. 895). Once a critical mass of states is socialized by the initially leading states and convinced of
the new norm, a 'norm cascade', the second stage, takes place in which state after state becomes a
follower of the new norm. In many cases norms reach this point by becoming institutionalized in
international law (p.  900). The third stage then consist of 'internalization' when such a big part of
the population (of states) is convinced of the new norm that it is no longer subject of debate and is
generally taken for granted (p. 895). In the context of international law, new norms are codified as
conventions or declarations that are adopted and signed by states. Consensus on the values or norms
on which these laws are based is vitally important, because there is no means of coercion if a law is
broken.  The  process  of  'norm growing'  in  international  institutions  like  the  United  Nations  is
therefore a slow but important process, because the agreement of the actors (states) on the norm that
lies behind a  law,  is  the only guarantee that it  will  be followed (Lâm, 2009, p.  591-592).  The
international  debate  on indigenous issues  can  be  approached as  such a  norm growing process.
Indigenous activists who try to improve the situation of their peoples, act as norm entrepreneurs in
an international forum where states are the actors who have to agree on and act in accordance with
norms. 
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Chapter 2. The Creation of the UNDRIP
In this  chapter,  the question of how the process  of creating new international  norms regarding
indigenous peoples'  rights  works,  will  be  answered.  The history of  the  process  of  creating  the
UNDRIP will  be discussed using the conceptual  tools  from the first  chapter.  In the process  of
creating the UNDRIP indigenous representatives participated alongside state representatives in the
annual meetings of the drafting commissions. In the final years of the Working Group on the Draft
Declaration a  norm cascade took place and the norms codified in  the UNDRIP gained enough
support to be adopted by the General Assembly.
2.1 International indigenous advocacy
When European settlers started to colonize large parts of the world, newly found territories already
inhabited by indigenous peoples were occupied by European conquerors who used international
law,  laws  they  among  themselves  agreed  upon,  to  ratify  and  legitimize  their  claim.  Sovereign
statehood was exclusively granted to European imperial powers and the indigenous inhabitants of
the colonized territories did not have any rights within this system of international law of which
they were no members (Keal, 2003,  p.  84; Pulitano, 2012,  p.  13). This left them powerless and
without any official status, as well as without any claim (within European international law) to the
lands they lived on. The descendants of the original inhabitants of colonial territories who still form
a distinct minority in their current nation, are now called indigenous.  It is their cultural, linguistic
and often also political uniqueness that leads them to fight for special rights in addition to general
human rights: indigenous rights, that protect the preservation of their culture, and especially the
right of self-determination. Indigenous peoples are to be found on all continents and they obviously
have very different histories and different current situations. Nonetheless much of their experiences
since their  colonization and especially their  dealings  with European powers  show parallels  and
therefore they are often categorized together as 'indigenous peoples' and their histories are told in
one account by many academic writers  (see for example Keal, 2003, Bodley,  2015 and Niezen,
2003).
Outside of the state, indigenous peoples lacked any international legal personality for a long
time (Sanders, 1998, p. 73). Yet,  changing international norms of treatment of indigenous peoples
by states, was their best hope. When the League of Nations was formed in 1919, some indigenous
leaders, who can be called pioneer norm entrepreneurs, tried to gain international attention and a
voice  in  international  affairs  by  petitioning  the  League  of  Nations,  but  as  there  was  no
acknowledgement of minority rights in the Covenant of the League, their appeal was rejected and
their voiceless position reaffirmed (p. 73). As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, a norm might have to
'fit' within existing normative frameworks to gain appreciation (1998, p. 908), and indigenous needs
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were not acknowledged in the state-centered discourse of the League. To be heard in (Western)
international institutions like the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, the right
way of 'framing' indigenous issues needed to be found by the norm entrepreneurs: by engaging the
norms already held by international actors, the indigenous cause might be helped by translating it
into  familiar  terms  for  the  Western  states.  Previous  protests  had  sounded  too  much  like
decolonization or self-determination for minorities, topics too sensitive at the time (and a threat to
the sovereignty of nation states) (Sanders, 1998, p.  75).  Finally in the 1960s an entrance into the
international arena was found by the lawyer and staff member of the UN Centre for Human Rights
Augusto Willemsen Diaz, who worked on issues of racial discrimination and used that language to
address indigenous issues. The work of Willemsen Diaz did get indigenous peoples on the agenda
of the United Nations: the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) found the subject important
enough to request a study on discrimination against indigenous populations in 1971 (p. 75). 
There  was  another  way  to  frame  indigenous  issues,  which  led  to  some  attention  for
indigenous people earlier on from the International Labour Organization. The ILO looked into the
situation  of  indigenous  workers  since  1921 (Xanthaki,  2007,  p.  49).  Here  working indigenous
people were treated as a disadvantaged part  of the working population whose position required
attention. In 1953 the ILO drew up the Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (Convention
107). This convention was quite thorough in the range of rights it granted to indigenous workers,
but its tone was rather assimilationist, in line with the norm of worldwide development of the time
(Lâm, 2009, p. 601; Xanthaki, 2007, p. 49). The Convention attempted to bring indigenous peoples
out of isolation and  develop them, a goal that disregarded the wishes of the indigenous peoples
concerned and did not allow for their  cultural  distinctiveness and the fact that they might have
different needs from the population at large (Xanthaki, 2007, p. 51). There was no attention to the
voices of indigenous peoples themselves.  Indigenous ways of life  were regarded as obstructing
progress, and assimilation into the dominant culture through development projects, was seen as the
solution to the disadvantaged position of indigenous peoples. By 1989 changes in the perception of
indigenous peoples, as well as the growing indigenous advocacy within the UN that is described in
other parts of this chapter, had led to a new Convention, No. 169, in which the distinct cultures,
languages and institutions of indigenous peoples were recognized and the goal of assimilation was
dropped (Xanthaki, 2007,  p.  69; Morgan, 2011,  p.  9). The top-down, state-centered approach to
development  had  since  Convention  107  changed  into  the  belief  that  all  people  subject  to  a
development project should be consulted and indigenous people should be granted some control
over their way of life (Xanthaki, 2007, p. 69). Instead of designing a solution for the problems of
the Subaltern and imposing it without consent, now for the first time the actual Subaltern subject
became  central  to  the  international  discussion.  In  the  Convention  this  is  visible  in  a  stronger
emphasis on rights, including group rights, and in self-identification as a fundamental criterion for
determining who are meant by 'indigenous peoples'. 
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2.2 The UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Between 1981 and 1983 the results of the study on discrimination of indigenous peoples authorized
by the ECOSOC, were published by Special Rapporteur José R. Martínez Cobo (Morgan, 2011, p.
10). In these reports, self-determination was mentioned as a basic precondition for a full exercise of
their fundamental rights (p. 11). Also, Martínez Cobo provided a working description of indigenous
peoples, that included as criteria a link with ancestral lands, a distinct ethnic identity different from
the current dominant society and a determination to preserve their social and cultural institutions for
future  generations,  amongst  other  things  (Lâm,  2009, p.  599-600).   The  discourse  around
indigenous peoples and their issues in international fora had by this time clearly changed from focus
on the voiceless Subaltern who is  discriminated and must  be developed, to  a focus on a vocal
activist  Subaltern,  ready  to  defend  his  rights  and  demanding  self-determination  in  matters  of
government, lifestyle and culture. The need for new international norms regarding the treatment of
indigenous peoples by the states they lived in, finally gained attention from international actors. As
a result of the Cobo report - and to meet the growing international advocacy of indigenous NGOs -
ECOSOC formed the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), a sub-group of the
UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (the Sub-
Commission). 
The WGIP consisted of five rotating state-appointed human right experts (members of the
Sub-Commission) and met annually in Geneva from 1982 onwards (Morgan, 2011,  p.  11;  Lâm,
2009, p.  601).  In  1985  the  WGIP decided  to  start  drafting  what  became  the  United  Nations
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in accordance with their mandate to formulate
standards  for  state-indigenous peoples  relations  (Morgan,  2011,  p.  10-11).  Thus  the  process  of
formulating new norms began, and the first stage of the norm cycle, norm emergence, had begun.
The Working Group opened its doors to state representatives as well as several organizations and
bodies to participate equally in the annual meetings, most importantly to indigenous organizations,
with  or  without  UN  accreditation  (Morgan,  2011,  p.  11-12;  Lâm,  2009, p.  601).  Indigenous
representatives  gladly took  this  unprecedented  opportunity  (Lâm,  2009,  p.  601)  to  address  the
Working Group and influence the Declaration in this early stage (Morgan, 2011, p. 12). In the first
session in 1982, fourteen indigenous organizations were present at the annual session and in 1993,
the year in which a first completed Draft Declaration was produced, 127 indigenous organizations
were present at the annual session (Sub-Commission, 1982, p. 3-4; 1993, p. 5-6). Among these were
organizations from all continents, like the Aboriginal Law Center, Federación Provincial Indígena
Aymara, Ka Lahui Hawaii, and the Southern Sudan Group (1993, p. 5-6). Unfortunately the reports
of the annual sessions of the WGIP have not always preserved their individual contributions to the
meetings1.  However,  what has been recorded is that representatives of indigenous organizations
expressed  their  wish  for  special  standards  for  indigenous  peoples  to  protect  them from forced
assimilation  and  integration  into  the  dominant  culture  within  their  state,  and  especially  new
standards regarding self-determination and their claims to land and resources to protect them from
dispossession  of  these  (Daes,  2011,  p.  17,20). Also,  indigenous  representatives  asked  for  the
1 See for example the commission report from 1993, which uses phrases like “many representatives of indigenous 
peoples” (Sub-Commission, 1993, p. 20) or “a number of representatives of indigenous peoples [...]” (p. 18). The same 
is true for Chairperson-Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes' later account of the proceedings (Daes, 2011). 
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inclusion of the right of compensation for past losses and deprivations  (p.  29).  In 1993 a Draft
Declaration  (DD) was completed  which  included many demands  of  indigenous  activists  (Lâm,
2009, p. 602) and was quite revolutionary, according to some commentators, in its content (Morgan,
2011, p. 12). 
 Two aspects of  the DD were significant.  Firstly,  the WGIP soon decided,  following the
wishes of indigenous peoples themselves, to change 'populations' to 'peoples' (Lâm, 2009, p. 603), a
term that recognizes the special character of the community and group identity of the indigenous
peoples  (Morgan,  2011,  p.  9;  Xanthaki,  2007,  p.  70).  The  term 'peoples'  has  a  significance  in
international law that is strongly linked with self-determination, which had made it too controversial
before. Now, however, the DD contained in Article 3 the right of self-determination for indigenous
peoples, the most important part of the Declaration for indigenous representatives (Xanthaki, 2007,
p.  109) and the most threatening part of it, to states. However, the DD also seemed to limit self-
determination to self-government: “Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right
to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to...” (Lâm,
2009, p.  604).  Nonetheless,  in  combination  with  Article  42,  that  states  that  the  rights  in  the
Declaration are minimum standards, it can also be read as defining just one minimal form of self-
determination (Morgan, 2011, p. 12).  The DD was then sent to the Commission on Human Rights,
which established the Working Group on the Draft Declaration (WGDD), as it has been known
since, in 1995 (p. 13).  
The WGDD met annually from 1995 to 2006 in Geneva and consisted of representatives of
the member states of its parent body, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) (ohchr.org). Its sole
purpose was to elaborate the Draft  Declaration, and prepare it  for consideration by the General
Assembly  (ohchr.org).  The  (state-representing)  members  of  the  WGDD  attempted  to  limit  the
influence of indigenous organizations by imposing stricter limits to the participation of NGOs in the
commission meetings than the WGIP had had (Lâm, 2009, p.  602). It seemed therefore that the
Subaltern voice in the proceedings would be mostly lost and indigenous activists were concerned
the Draft Declaration would be changed at the expense of indigenous peoples (Morgan, 2001,  p.
13). However, after insistent lobbying by indigenous delegates, a procedure was agreed upon by the
CHR to grant indigenous organizations without the needed consultative status with the ECOSOC,
access to the meetings as well (ohchr.org; Morgan 2011, p. 13). Many representatives of indigenous
organizations from all continents were present thereafter, for example the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission, Baha’i International Community, the Indigenous World Association and
the World Council of Indigenous Peoples at the 1995 annual session (CHR, 1996a, p.3-4).  
In this  new Working Group, the two decisive issues that had already been dealt  with at
length in the WGIP came back on the table: the usage of the term 'peoples' and the inclusion of the
right of self-determination in the Declaration.  Both issues concern concepts ('peoples'  and 'self-
determination') that have controversial positions in discourses of international law. 'Peoples' have
the  right  of  self-determination  according  to  the  UN  Charter,  and  'self-determination'  comes
dangerously close to secession and breach of state sovereignty in the eyes of some states. In 1996
nine states in the WGDD had fundamental objections to self-determination for indigenous peoples,
while five others said only to accept the principle as long as the territorial integrity of states would
be explicitly protected (Morgan, 2011,  p.  14). For indigenous peoples, both the usage of the term
'peoples' and the right of self-determination were vital elements of the UNDRIP (CHR, 1996a, p.9;
1999a, p.4). The concept 'peoples' is needed as the subject of collective rights, because these cannot
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be granted to  an individual,  only to a group. Indigenous peoples see themselves as historically
distinctive peoples, denied any voice in international discourse and robbed of all their rights for a
long time, and because of this their representatives felt that they could only be respected as equals
in  international  law when they were  granted  the  same position  as  other  peoples  of  the  world.
Besides,  only self-determination would actually grant  indigenous peoples  any real  international
legal personality and therefore access to international fora (Lâm, 2009, p. 607). 
 After much discussion in the years that followed most states gradually came around to the
principle of self-determination (Morgan, 2011, p. 14). The 3rd Article on self-determination stayed in
the Declaration (as did the term 'peoples'), but Article 3 was in the Final Draft followed by Article 4
which states the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy in matters relating to internal affairs. This
causes some haziness as to whether this is meant as the only interpretation of the principle of self-
determination of Article 3, but indigenous representatives accepted it to ensure the support of the
state representatives (Lâm, 2009, p. 609). The Human Rights Council (which had by now replaced
the  Commission on Human Rights)  adopted the  proposed text  and submitted  it  to  the  General
Assembly (GA) in 2006. Indigenous representatives from now on did not have any formal access to
the proceedings any more (Lâm, 2009, p. 602). Permanent Representative of the Philippines Hilario
G  Davide  Jr.  conducted  further  consultations  with  the  states  that  wanted  amendments  to  the
UNDRIP, like the US and Australia, and a group of African states (Morgan, 2011, p. 16). Mainly to
satisfy the African states,  there was a new provision added as Article 46(1),  which stated very
clearly that  nothing from the  Declaration  may be  interpreted  as  giving  the  right  to  impair  the
territorial  integrity  of  sovereign  states  (p.  18).  Maivân Clech  Lâm rightly points  out  how this
successful attempt at  redrafting the Declaration to fit state interests was conveniently done at a
moment  when  the  indigenous  beneficiaries  of  the  Declaration  no  longer  had  a  voice  in  the
proceedings (2009, p. 614). However, for the norms of indigenous rights in the UNDRIP a tipping
point was reached and a critical mass of convinced states led to Finnemore and Sikkink's norm
cascade: the indigenous rights in the UNDRIP gained enough followers to become institutionalized.
The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the General
Assembly on 3 September 2007. 
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Chapter 3.  Unequal Power Relations and Indigenous 
Contributions in the UNDRIP: a Discourse Analysis
In the previous chapter the process of creation of the UNDRIP was discussed. This gave some
insight into the position and influence of indigenous peoples in this process. What exactly has been
their contribution with respect to the content of the UNDRIP and what position indigenous peoples
have in the final text of the UNDRIP, will be the subject of this chapter. To find an answer to these
questions,  the  discourse  of  the  UNDRIP itself  is  explored.  Two questions  are  leading  in  this:
whether or not indigenous peoples have agency (an empowered position to speak and/or act from)
in the language of the UNDRIP, and whether or not their most important demand, the right of self-
determination,  was  granted  them in  this  Declaration.  For  this  a  discourse  analysis  of  the  final
version of the UNDRIP that was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 was conducted. To gain
more insight into the changes over time in the UNDRIP with regard to self-determination, different
articles  on  self-determination  have  been  compared  with  their  version  from  the  1994  Draft
Declaration. All reports of the WGDD of its eleven annual sessions, from 1995 till 2005, have been
analysed to find what is recorded about the contributions of indigenous representatives during the
sessions of the commission. The results of this are used to provide context to the discourse analysis.
This chapter continues in two parts: first the position of indigenous peoples and the power relations
between the  actors  in  the UNDRIP are  discussed  to  reveal  whether  indigenous peoples,  as  the
Subaltern, have agency and are heard in this discourse. Secondly the norm of self-determination as
it is laid down in the UNDRIP and the contribution of the indigenous representatives regarding this
norm is analysed.
3.1 Agency: Unequal power relations in the discourse of the UNDRIP
Analysing the discourse of the UNDRIP can help us grasp what place and position indigenous
peoples have in this document. The United Nations is the framework in which the UNDRIP has
meaning, along with other declarations like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Because
states recognize the UN as institution that has moral authority and can declare new norms, they are
prepared to agree on a legislative document like the UNDRIP in meetings of commissions of the
UN and adopt the final declaration in the General Assembly. The moral weight of the UNDRIP is
declared to be “a standard of achievement to be pursued...”, (2007 p.3) which at the same time
implies the UN has the authority to determine such a standard. Not only does the UN claim this
moral authority, but it also claims universality for its norms. In the discourse of the UNDRIP the
UN reconstitutes this universality. The UNDRIP refers to several other UN documents (literally, or
more covertly by reusing some of its language) as authoritative sources and standards of norms,
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most importantly the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The factual tone
of the sentence “Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples” (GA, 2007, p. 1)
and the words “the inherent rights of indigenous peoples...” naturalize the equality of peoples and
the idea that human rights are a natural, “inherent” thing gives them the air of facts. The importance
or “urgent need” to respect human rights, the very frequent usage of the word “right(s)” and even
“inherent rights” when spoken of the needs or entitlements of indigenous peoples (GA, 2007, p. 2)
all  stress  the  importance  and the  universality  of  the  norms the  UN advocates.  Throughout  the
UNDRIP, the 'language of human rights', or dominant human rights discourse, is used and these
rights are reconstituted as natural, as in the following preambular paragraph:
“Convinced  that  the  recognition  of  the  rights  of  indigenous  peoples  in  this  Declaration  will
enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, based on
principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good faith,”  
(GA, 2007, p. 3)
Here the compliance with UN norms is formulated and presented as the natural result of giving
indigenous peoples their rights. The norms that are mentioned (human rights, justice, democracy,
non-discrimination) are considered natural and universal.  The normative authority of the UN and
the universality of its norms (at least, their universal position in the discourse of UN documents) is
something the indigenous organizations that helped create the UNDRIP, conformed to or complied
with when they decided to contribute to the UNDRIP. This means, they agreed to participate in this
framework in which (Western) human rights norms are taken for granted, like in the preambular
paragraph above. This is a choice they made to gain influence and a voice at the UN, but it also
means they had to adopt the language of human rights and accept UN norms and values as well as
submit to the power of the institutions of the UN and the states. The irony is that the instrument that
is created to protect indigenous culture and self-determination is therefore limiting their freedom
too. This also clarifies the positions of the UN and sovereign states on the one hand and indigenous
peoples on the other: the first party grants the second one its rights, which makes the first one the
one in power, and it uses that power to strongly advice the second party what to do with those
rights.  Among these granted rights are  many rights  emphasizing the agency,  freedom and self-
determination of indigenous peoples. But, strikingly, what choices indigenous peoples should make
when using their freedom, is already decided and spelled out by the UN: they should cooperate with
the state and follow the norms that are mentioned. The compliance of indigenous representatives to
the UN and its norms seem to deny indigenous peoples real agency. 
The  absence  of  real  agency for  indigenous  peoples  becomes  even  more  apparent  when
looking at the literal text of many articles. While states have an active position in many articles of
the Declaration, indigenous peoples are presented as the passive recipients of a right. Eighteen of
the 46 articles2 exist of a part where a right of indigenous peoples is stated, followed by a part which
mentions the action states will take to ensure this right3. In these articles indigenous peoples are
only direct or indirect object to the actions that are (to be) taken. When looking at the grammatical
structure of the used sentences, it stands out that in Articles 21 and 22 where indigenous people in a
2 These articles are 8, 11-19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32 and 36. 
3 Or some variation of this, for example Articles 18 and 19 which deal with the same subject, where 18 states the right 
and 19 the part states play.
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disadvantaged position (women, elders, disabled people etc.) are mentioned, these people are not
even subject (or object) of the sentence. Their passive, powerless position seems to be stressed even
more. Most articles in the UNDRIP are meant to give indigenous peoples a stronger social and
political position and more influence on their own lives, but the framing of these rights in the form
of an action on part of the state takes the initiative away from them and therefore robs them of the
promised agency. Also, in several passages where indigenous peoples are promised real control, this
is followed by an obsolete articulation of what this new power should lead to, like:
“Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands,
territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and
traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,”
(GA, 2007, p. 2)
Again,  like  earlier,  a  strong  advice  is  given  for  what  to  do  with  the  control  that  is  given  to
indigenous peoples. Self-determination is considered to benefit indigenous peoples, as long as they
follow Western norms like development. 
What can be concluded about the agency of these actors from the analysis of the discourse of
the UNDRIP, is that the pervasiveness of the language of human rights and the legislative power of
the UN reconstitute and reformulate the powerful position of the UN and especially the nation states
by propagating Western norms. Indigenous peoples have a very passive position in the text and are
in some articles told what to do with their freedom, namely, to follow Western norms. Indigenous
peoples, in the form of their representation by indigenous organizations at the UN, are subjected to
these norms since they agreed to corroborate and contribute to the UNDRIP. This means they gave
up some of their freedoms to have their  rights protected by the UN. By endorsing the Western
framework of the UN they affirm their own subjected position in it, as Spivak argued before.
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3.2 Indigenous contributions to the UNDRIP
What exactly did indigenous representatives contribute to the content of the UNDRIP? What was
their opinion on the articles of the UNDRIP and what demands did they bring to the commission
sessions? In the annual session reports of the WGDD (1994-2006) the representatives of indigenous
organizations seem to speak with one voice fairly often, or at least, they have been recorded in the
reports this way. In six of the eleven reports there is no mention at all or only very few mentions of
individual  indigenous  organizations  (or  their  representatives)  in  the  minutes  of  the  discussions
(CHR,  1996a;  CHR,  2002-2006).  Indigenous  representatives  are  mostly  mentioned  as  “all
representatives”,  “some  representatives”  or  just  “indigenous  representatives”  (see  for  example
CHR, 2002, p.8-9; CHR, 2003, p.11). In the report of the first session of 1995 no mention was made
at all of individual indigenous contributions (CHR, 1996a). In the following year, an indigenous
representative read a statement, agreed upon by the caucus of indigenous peoples, that asked for an
immediate  adoption  by the  commission  of  the  Draft  Declaration  of  1994 without  change as  a
statement of minimum standards (CHR, 1996b, p.5). The report continues:
“Furthermore, he requested that there be a plenary consensus on a change of the internal rules of
procedure guiding the working group specifically providing for the equal and full participation of
indigenous peoples in its  deliberations,  including full  participation as partners in the decision-
making authority of the working group. Inherent in this request was the recognition that the report
of  the  working  group  must  be  produced  with  the  full  involvement  and  consent  of  indigenous
peoples.”
(CHR, 1996b, p.5)
It seems the indigenous organizations wanted to give a strong signal of dissatisfaction with both the
extent to which the commission paid heed to the contribution of indigenous representatives and with
the production of the reports of the commission in which they, as stated above, are often silent or
only  mentioned  as  a  group.  Appreciation  of  their  statement  was  stated  by  government
representatives  and  the  Chairperson-Rapporteur  in  the  following  discussion,  but  many  state
representatives objected to the adoption of the Draft Declaration as minimum standards and as the
same demands return in the 1997 report in many individual formulations, there is no indication that
that demand was met by the WGDD (CHR, 1997, p.5-6). In the report of that and the following four
years, more individual contributions are recorded, especially in the report of the 1999 session (CHR,
1999). However, it is striking that in the last four annual session reports, attention to indigenous
contributions  is  again  limited  to  summarized  contributions  of  “some”  or  “all”  indigenous
representatives and no, or only one or two individual mentions (CHR, 2003-2006). 
What  does  become  clear  from  the  contributions  of  indigenous  representatives  that  are
recorded, is  that self-determination was the crucial  part  of the UNDRIP for indigenous peoples
(Xanthaki  109;  CHR,  1999a,  p.6-7).  At  the  same time,  this  was  the  most  difficult  part  of  the
UNDRIP to agree with for states, because giving indigenous peoples control would mean loss of
control for states. Comparison of the Draft Declaration made by the WGIP in 1994 and the final
version of the UNDRIP shows that the norm of self-determination was part of the UNDRIP from an
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early stage (as Article 3) in almost unchanged wording. The report  of the 1996 annual  session
recorded that “all indigenous organizations opposed the inclusion of any limitation or qualification
of  article  3”  (CHR,  1996b,  p.11).  For  states  self-determination  is  problematic  as  it  comes
dangerously  close  to  sovereignty,  and  that  is  a  property  of  nation  states  alone.  Indigenous
representatives at the WGDD however considered self-determination an inherent right, and 
“some indigenous organizations stated that a balance between the right of self-determination of
indigenous peoples and the territorial and political unity and integrity of States would result from
the recognition and respect of that right to self-determination.”
(CHR, 1996, p.11)
In other words, granting indigenous peoples self-determination would be a gesture of mutual trust
that  would  result  in  a  stronger  integrity  of  the  state,  not  a  breach of  it.  Unfortunately for  the
indigenous  organizations,  the  state  representatives  did  not  agree.  Comparison  of  the  Draft
Declaration and the final version of the UNDRIP shows that the interpretation of self-determination
has been renegotiated and has been limited by the addition of other articles, namely Articles 4 and
46 (Sub-Commission,  1994,  p.5  and GA,  2007,  p.4,11).  Article  4  was  Article  31  in  the  Draft
Declaration  of  1994.  In  this  original  version,  the  article  states  the  right  to  autonomy or  self-
government, and calls this “a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination”. In the
final version of the UNDRIP, this article is moved to be the article following Article 3 about self-
determination, and the wording is now:
“Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means
for financing their autonomous functions.”
(GA, 2007, p. 4)
The  change  from “a  specific  form of  self-determination”  to  “in  exercising  their  right  of  self-
determination” is important, because the first version implies that self-government is just one form
of self-determination, while the second one seems to imply self-determination has to be interpreted
as self-government, and not otherwise. Therefore this change, together with the movement of this
article from 31 to 4 (behind the self-determination article, Article 3) could be seen as limiting self-
determination to self-government. Article 46 also was changed to prevent a too liberal interpretation
of self-determination, by including an explicit part protecting the sovereignty of states. This article,
when it still was Article 45 in 1994, only stated that the content of the Declaration could not be
interpreted to legitimize any act contrary to the Charter of the UN (Sub-Commission, 1994, p. 15).
The final version of the article, which is much more elaborate, adds amongst other things, that
nothing in the Declaration can be
“construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.”
(GA, 2007, p. 11)
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All these changes in Articles 4 and 46 have constrained the extent of the norm of self-determination
for indigenous peoples. Self-determination has been given to indigenous peoples, but not without
strong limitations on its interpretation. More changes in the articles have been made to emphasize or
protect the sovereign position of states. In Articles 37 and 38 parts were removed that could be
interpreted as impairing the sovereignty of states, namely the possibility that international bodies
settle  disputes  between  states  and  indigenous  peoples,  and  the  obligation  for  states  to  include
indigenous rights in national legislation. Also removed was a preambular paragraph from the 1994
version which stated that indigenous peoples have the right to freely determine their relationships
with States (Sub-Commission, 1994, p. 4). This seems to be replaced, in terms of content, by the
preambular paragraph quoted earlier, stating that the UNDRIP should lead to harmonious relations
between states and indigenous peoples.
In  the  strong institutional  framework  of  states,  based  on the  norm of  state  sovereignty,
unconditional  self-determination  for  indigenous  peoples  is  very  problematic.  Indigenous
representatives must have expected that and must have been aware of the fact that the Declaration
they helped create, was to be signed and implemented by states who would not so easily undermine
their own stability with it. Also, by agreeing to work within the framework of international law to
protect their rights, their freedom would also be limited in the sense that they would have to accept
and adopt the concepts and norms of international law, like the power of states and sovereignty;
norms  that  once  were  used  to  subjugate  them.  The  indigenous  writer  Taiaiake  Alfred,  already
mentioned in the first chapter, talks about the problem that treaties between indigenous peoples and
states  pose  for  indigenous  peoples:  sovereignty  was  the  basis  of  colonialism,  and  indigenous
peoples can only subjugate themselves more to the power of the state by striking a deal to get partial
self-determination.  However,  the  indigenous  representatives  both  at  the  WGIP and  the  WGDD
fought very hard for unlimited self-determination. At the end of the annual session in 2005, self-
determination  was  one  of  the  issues  on  which  there  was  still  no  consensus  in  the  WGDD.
Chairperson-Rapporteur Luis Enrique Chávez decided to submit to the Human Rights Council his
own proposal on the last outstanding issues (Morgan, 2011, 15). As discussed in the second chapter,
there followed more negotiations between state representatives at the General Assembly. Indigenous
organizations  had no access to  or say in  the proceedings  any more at  this  stage,  and the final
decisions on the exact interpretation of self-determination in the UNDRIP were taken by states. The
end  result  was  therefore  never  agreed  upon  by  the  indigenous  representatives  at  the  WGDD.
Indigenous peoples were, in this sense, ultimately silenced after all. 
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Conclusion
How did the process of creating the UNDRIP work and have indigenous peoples really been heard
in it? Has their influence paid off in the form of self-determination as a new codified norm? As was
shown in chapter two, the need for new international norms for the treatment of indigenous peoples
led to the creation of two commissions within the UN that subsequently worked on the UNDRIP as
a means of codifying these new norms. These expert-composed and state-composed commissions
reluctantly allowed for access for indigenous organizations, who were allowed to contribute to the
discussions. However, as became clear in chapter three, their mentioning in the reports of the annual
meetings is often unspecific and their demands of more influence in the process as well as unlimited
self-determination in the UNDRIP have not been met.  The last decisions made on certain issues,
among which  self-determination,  were made at  a  stage  where indigenous organizations  had no
longer access to the proceedings: the Subaltern was again reduced to a passive object of the norms
of  international  law.  Indigenous  peoples  have  mainly  gained  a  stronger  reformulation  of  their
human rights within the limits the UN framework sets. Self-determination without limitations on its
interpretation,  as  demanded  by  indigenous  organizations  during  the  writing  process,  was  not
granted. The position of indigenous peoples as the Subaltern has not improved by their contribution
to the UNDRIP nor by the articles of the UNDRIP itself. Indigenous representatives did speak and
did contribute to the UNDRIP, but they could only do so by adopting the discourse of Western
norms and accept the authority and power of states and the UN over them. This has reconfirmed and
reinforced by their subjection to the authority of Western institutions and norms. International law
had indeed functioned in the ambiguous way Sundhya Pahuja described: it has given the Subaltern
rights, but within a system that was originally designed to subjugate him and it has subjected him
once more to the power of this system. In Spivak's words, the Subaltern only confirms his voiceless
position by trying to speak, because he speaks in a Western paradigm that is built to protect Western
interests.  In  terms  of  norm  dynamics,  the  existing  framework  of  norms  was  so  strongly
institutionalized that the new norms of rights for indigenous peoples could only be acceptable to the
critical mass of states when they were made to fit into existing international law.
Can  Subaltern  people  really  breach  their  underprivileged  position  within  the  Western
framework? This is very difficult.  With Western thought in a universalized position,  indigenous
contributions will have to be framed to fit well with Western values or they will be ignored. As
Briggs and Sharp argued, in a neutral framework where Western thought is just one voice in the
discussion and not considered universal, indigenous voices might have a more equal position and be
heard more easily. However, within the UN this is not possible. The framework of international law
will not make it possible to change that system itself. Indigenous organizations can get access to
meetings, but this does not mean they get to change the system from within. They have the choice
to play a role within the system as it is, or stay outside of it. Which should they choose? What works
for Subaltern groups that want to defend their interests internationally? As indigenous peoples have
shown with the creation of the UNDRIP, even from the difficult position of the Subaltern within the
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framework of international law, it is still possible to act as norm entrepreneur and have new norms
institutionalized, even when the institutionalized norms are not as radical as was hoped. This will
not  change their  position  as  the  Subaltern,  but  can  help  to  promote  some of  their  interests  in
international law. Now, at least,  there is a Declaration to fall back on when indigenous peoples
experience violation of their rights. The Declaration might act as a mediator between Subaltern
people whose voice is easily lost in political discourses, and the powerful institutions that have the
agency to influence their lot but do not hear them. With the UNDRIP indigenous peoples have a tool
to make Western powers listen: a tool from the West's own tool kit. Raising their voices at the UN,
choosing to subject themselves to the system no matter their subjugated position, achieved at least
this for indigenous peoples. Other Subaltern groups may take heart from that.  
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